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I. INTRODUCTION
The law of privacy is a patchwork of disparate doctrines that resembles
Dr. Johnson's definition of metaphysical poetry: "the most heterogeneous
of ideas yoked by violence together." The right to be let alone, as coined
by Judge Cooley, covers tort-based privacy, constitutional privacy embody-
ing personal autonomy and search and seizure. The lines are blurred and
each shades into the other. As a result, it is not surprising to find that the
law has trouble keeping them straight.a
* Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center. Special thanks to
Scott Solkoffs singular research skills.
I. See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966); Milton R. Konvitz, Privacyand the Law:
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Florida's Constitution first embraced a right to privacy in its search and
seizure provision.' Article I, section 12 was amended in 1968 (by referend-
um), adding private communications to the interests protected by the
clause.3 In 1983, Florida's protection of privacy ebbed after voters amend-
ed section 12 to conform with United States Supreme Court interpretations
of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In Bernie v. State,4
the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the conformity amendment binds
Florida courts to follow future decisions of the United States Supreme
Court.5 In this regard, Florida's conformity clause chilled individual
liberties and placed federalism in a deep freeze.
In November of 1980, Florida voters adopted a freestanding constitu-
tional amendment protecting privacy. Section 23 of the Florida Constitution
provides: "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided
herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of
access to public records and meetings as provided by law."6  On the
surface, section 23 seemed to offer the public more blanket privacy
protection while artfully upholding Florida's strong presumption of access
to public records. The amendment was hailed as a giant step forward in
safeguarding individual privacy.7
From the distance of fourteen years, a key question is whether Florida's
constitutional privacy protection has made a difference? Gathering
countervailing forces have cast a shadow on section 23 and put privacy's
promise on hold. In part, blame lies with the overabundance of caution by
Florida courts which seem reluctant to take section 23's straightforward
command at face value; however, blame also lies with the turning tide of the
law, leaving privacy by the wayside. For example, the United States
A Philosophical Prelude, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 272 (1966); William L. Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
2. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
3. See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (1968 revision).
4. 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988).
5. Id. at 991.
6. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (added Nov. 4, 1980).
7. E.g., Gerald B. Cope, Jr., To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, 6
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 671, 673 (1978) [hereinafter Cope, To Be Let Alone] ("Ratification
would place Florida among the national leaders in an emerging trend to protect individual
privacy."). Cope's article traces proposals of the 1978 Constitutional Revision Commission,
and weighs how constitutional privacy would reshape Florida privacy law. Id.; see also
Gerald B. Cope, Jr. Toward a Right of Privacy as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 5
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 631 (1977).
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Supreme Court of the 1980's sharply pulled back on the use of privacy and
scholars have noted how competing constitutional interests are strongly
contesting-, privacy's turf..
Hopes ran high when section 23 took effect, reflecting as it did a strong
commitment to the right to be let alone. Unlike the unwritten and fragile
federal privacy dimly perceived in the penumbras of the United States
Constitution, Florida enshrined the principle that privacy is an interest in its
own right, entitled to a prominent position in the state constitution. In
sifting through section 23's legacy, performance should be measured by
reach as well as by grasp.
If section 23 was more or less modeled along the lines of federal
constitutional privacy, thus inheriting its metes and bounds, it would serve
little purpose. However, the language of several leading section 23 cases
claim that Florida's zone of privacy was designed to sweep wider than its
federal counterpart. Yet, in the wake of fourteen years of scorekeeping, it's
open to question whether section 23's salutary impact outweighs its
shortcomings.
Enlarging the state zone of privacy might have meant that section 23
would fill in the blanks left by United States Supreme Court rulings.
Measured by this principle, section 23 comes up empty. Another yardstick
of its performance is to ask whether section 23's track record could have
been achieved under alternative legal lines of reasoning. For example,
Jehovah Witnesses are entitled to refuse blood transfusions in Florida, not
by virtue of the right to privacy, but as a by-product of the free exercise of
religion guaranteed under the federal charter. 9 Likewise, without invoking
privacy, victimless crimes have been challenged under free speech and due
process grounds and a gay parent's right to adopt children can be grounded
on an equal protection footing.
Even when measured against the level of privacy protection prevailing
when section 23 was adopted, the picture is mixed. For example, Florida's
sodomy statute fell in 1971 before a First Amendment challenge.'0 With
8. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (striking down Florida's statutory ban
on publication of name of rape victims in face of the First Amendment's guarantee of
freedom of the press); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem For A Heavyweight: A Farewell To
Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORN. L. REV. 291 (1983) (mapping out how the
First Amendment defers to media definition of newsworthy and how this has eroded the
privacy tort of disclosure of private facts).
9. See In re Dubreuil, 18 Fla. L. Weekly S575 (Fla. Nov. 4, 1993).
10. While section 800.01 wasoverturned, section 800.02 may still be read to bar private
consensual sodomy. See Mohammed v. State, 561 So. 2d 384 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
1994]
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the possible exception of cases covering the right to die, Florida's privacy
provision has made little dent in the state of the law.
If section 23 sweeps no wider than federal constitutional privacy, it
serves little purpose save symbolism. The record of several states adopting
constitutional privacy protection offers a window on section 23's untapped
wealth. For example, Califomia ensures bank depositors protection against
subpoenas. 1 For a while, Alaskans could smoke pot at home under
privacy's umbrella.12 Some states outpace Florida even without tapping
privacy. For example, Massachusetts and New Jersey relied on equal
protection grounds to enable poor women to obtain free abortions. 13 While
it's true that Congress' refusal to fund abortions was sustained in Harris v.
McRae,4 individual states are free to strike a different balance. This is
one area where section 23 might have left its mark-a dramatic departure
from federal law that would hammer home the fact that Florida's privacy
protection is more than a prop, that it pays more than lip service to the right
to be let alone.
To complicate matters, section 23's reach has been checked by voters.
In the overlap where Griswoldprivacy shades into the Fourth Amendment's
turf, the conformity amendment has placed a constitutional straitjacket on
efforts to enlist privacy in the fight against undue searches and seizures.
Simply put, Florida must ape United States Supreme Court Fourth
Amendment rulings. Despite short-lived artful dodges by Florida courts to
sneak section 23 in through the back door, search and seizure law stands
undisturbed by section 23.
Privacy is left in limbo in light of other legal developments. All too
often, the right to be let alone loses out to competing constitutional claims
like the First Amendment. For example, the right of "John Does,"
uncharged of any crime, to preserve their anonymity in the Willets
prostitution case was outweighed by the press' First Amendment right of
access to "public records." 5 When Florida's Legislature tried, in the name
of privacy, to bar the publication of the names of rape victims, the United
States Supreme Court upended the statute under the banner of freedom of
11. See, e.g., Burrows v. People, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974).
12. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975); ALASKA CONST. art. 1,
§ 22.
13. See, e.g., Jaffe v. Sharp, 463 F. Supp. 222 (D. Mass. 1978); Right to Choose v.
Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982).
14. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
15. Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla. Inc., v. Doe, 612 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1992).
[Vol. 18
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 5
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/5
Sanchez
the press." In Atwell v. Sacred Heart Hospital,7 the natural mother's
stake in preserving her anonymity had to give way to her child's right to
know. 8
Section 23 contains a built-in limitation that serves to blunt its impact.
Unlike the broad reach of California's state constitutional privacy provision,
section 23 governs only intrusions laid to the state. 9 While breaches of
privacy are on the rise in private employment, remediable only under the
largely orphaned tort of privacy, section 23 stands idly by. If the federal
stance on narrowing state action is any guide, section 23 can be further
weakened by rendering it harder to show state action. In doing so, worthy
claims are discarded at the outset without reaching the merits. Finally, state
action can serve as a double bind. By virtue of governing only public
employment, section 23's privacy cases run the risk of being framed as
search and seizure cases, thus lowering the iron curtain of the conformity
amendment.
However, the picture is not altogether grim. Florida is probably as far-
reaching as any state in empowering the dying with some measure of control
over their fate. But one can conceive of a truly brilliant stroke: extending
the right to die to authorizing doctor-assisted suicide.2°
II. FLORIDA PRIVACY LAW
A. Public Records
Although Florida's public records law clings to the presumption of
access to all governmental records, 2' there have always been exceptions
16. The Fla. Star v. B.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989)
17. 520 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1988).
18. Id. at 31; see also FLA. STAT. § 395.017 (1991) (Florida's hospital record statute).
19. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
20. While many claim doctor-assisted suicide is a matter of policy best left to the
Legislature, some cast the right to die as a constitutional right. For example, Dr. Kevorkian's
lawyer argues that a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide exists despite Michigan's
February 1993 law banning assisted suicide. Michigan's law was enacted in response to nine
suicides assisted by Kevorkian. See Dr. Death Ordered to Stand Trial, WASH. POST, Sept.
10, 1993, at A3. Michigan's ban on doctor-assisted suicides was deemed unconstitutional,
but the appeals process has yet to run its course.
21. FLA. STAT. § 119.01 (1991). For a treatment of Florida's constitutional mandates
on public records law, see Patricia A. Gleason & Joslyn Wilson, The Florida Constitutional
Open Government Amendments: Article 1, Section 24 and Article 3, Section 4(e), Florida
Constitution, Let the Sunshine In, 18 NOVA L. REv. 973 (1993).
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designed to protect privacy rights that may otherwise be invaded.22 The
second sentence of article I, section 23 recites that "[t]his section shall not
be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and
meetings as provided by law." As case law on section 23 has developed,
it has become evident that it is on a collision course with Florida's Public
Records Act.23 How to read the two together has been drawn into question
in a number of cases, including one of the key section 23 cases to date.
Privacy loomed as the key issue in Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel
Wagering,24 where the Florida Supreme Court held that the subpoena of
bank records without notice to the account holders does not sacrifice their
privacy interests.23 Of more enduring value than the sundry facts or
holding of the case, however, was what the court had to say about the
footing and reach of the infant privacy provision.
When it comes to bank records, in other words, the right to privacy
does not command notice to a bank depositor so long as the subpoena serves
a state interest of the highest order. The opinion comes to this conclusion
after sounding a clear standard of judicial review and a ringing declaration
that Florida's right to privacy leaves its federal cousin in the dust.
Or does it? In California Bankers Ass 'n v. Shulti 6 and United States
v. Miller,27 the United States Supreme Court held that a federal investiga-
tive agency may subpoena bank records without notifying the depositor.28
In California, where the right of privacy looms larger than under the Federal
Constitution,29 the courts and Legislature have rejected the federal rule,
thereby framing a procedure whereby a depositor may quash the subpoe-
na.3" Even though other states have also rejected the California Bank-
22. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 382.025 (birth records); 393.13 (retarded persons); 394.459
(clinical records of mental patients); 396.112 (alcohol treatment); 397.053, 397.096 (drug
abuse); 400.321 (nursing home ombudsman committees), 827.07 (child abuse) (1979).
23. See Cope, To Be Let Alone, supra note 7, at 675.
24. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
25. Id. at 548.
26. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
27. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
28. Miller, 425 U.S. at 455; Shultz, 416 U.S. at 68.
29. See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PRIVACY LAW IN THE STATES 9-1I
(1977). The Commission was created by the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5,
88 Stat. 1896, reproduced in comment to 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. 1975).
30. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7460 (Deering 1982); PRIVACY LAW IN THE STATES, supra
note 29, at 12-13; cf Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 977 (Cal. 1975) (civil
discovery).
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ers/Miller rule,31 Florida has not-despite section 23.
Among the earliest of "public records" cases is Florida Board of Bar
Examiners re: Applicant.32 In that case, a budding lawyer complained
about questions posed by the Bar application calling for disclosure of
psychiatric counseling-information which falls into the public domain. The
court ruled that section 23 renders psychiatric counseling answers to bar
application questions beyond the reach of public scrutiny.33
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ferre,34 the court underscored that
section 23 governs state and not private acts. In an abuse of process claim
brought by a mayor against a private citizen who petitioned for disclosure
of public records, the court ruled that absent state action, the mayor could
not enlist the support of section 23. The court seemed to say that it was the
party to the lawsuit who abused process, not the state which framed the law
on which the underlying claim rested. Section 23 may be brought to bear
only against governmental intrusions, not those undertaken by private
parties.35
Section 23 may also yield at times to the public's right of access to
court records. In Goldberg v. Johnson,36 the court let the light in on the
terms of a settlement agreement and guardianship documents detailing the
estate of Shepard Broad Law Center benefactor, Leo Goodwin, Sr.,
31. In Alaska, bank records are confidential and shall not be made public without notice
to the depositor, unless disclosure is sought under a valid search warrant. ALASKA STAT. §
06.05.175 (1993). In California, a bank customer is entitled to ten days notice before a state
investigator can obtain access to his or her depositor records. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7460
(Deering 1982). In Maryland, the customer must be given twenty-one days notice prior to
disclosure. MD. CODE ANN., § 225 (1990). There is a fourteen day notice requirement in
Oklahoma. OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, §§ 2201-2206 (1984).
32. 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983).
33. See Cope, To Be Let Alone, supra note 7, at 712 n.253, 713 n.254 (citing pre-section
23 Bar application question cases: Florida Bar v. Hefty, 213 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1968)
(questions about sex with a minor-opinion did not address privacy, but Ervin, J., did in
dissent); Florida Board of Bar Examiners re Eimers, 358 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1978) (Florida
Supreme Court under rational basis analysis held being gay does not render one unfit for Bar)
and cases addressing the standards for disbarment: Florida Bar v. Kay, 232 So. 2d 378 (Fla.
1970) (disbarment for public gay conduct-Ervin, J., claims this amounts to invasion of
privacy)).
34. 636 F. Supp. 970 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
35. Compare California's Constitutional privacy provision which, alone among the states,
entails no state action requirement. In other words, the conduct of purely private actors falls
within the reach of the privacy provision.
One way to limit the reach of section 23 would be to follow the much debated example
set by the United States Supreme Court of narrowing the definition of state action.
36. 485 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
1994]
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overriding claims of privacy." Unlike Goldberg, the court in Sentinel
Communications Co. v. Smith" enlisted privacy in the service of barring
newspaper access to sealed court records in a domestic relations case.39
While the husband-father in the case happened to be a judge, this public
office did not turn this private litigant into a public figure thereby strength-
ening the case for media access. Invoking privacy found under the Federal
Constitution as well as section 23, the court noted that "if the privacy rights
of the litigants and third persons in this case are not recognized and
respected, then no citizen has any right of privacy in private litigation."4
The court records remained under lock and key.
In light of Smith, it seems the law balances the nature of the records
under review with privacy. Such delicate balancing was at work in
Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Service, Inc.41 where the privacy
interests of blood donors outweighed an AIDS victim's claim to subpoena
names and addresses of blood donors who may have contributed the tainted
blood. 2
In another leading case, Florida Freedom Newspapers, -Inc. v.
Sirmons,43 the court found that section 23 does not foreclose the press from
obtaining court records shedding light on a state senator's divorce." The
court ruled that section 23 does not create a right to private judicial
proceedings, unlike the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Sentinel Communi-
cations Co. v. Smith.45 In concurring, Justice Nimmons added that
"[w]hile I agree with the majority's statement that Article I, section 23 does
not create a right to private judicial proceedings, it seems to me that such
Florida constitutional provision deserves to be weighed as a significant
factor in civil cases, particularly those in which the public's interests are not
37. Id. at 1390.
38. 493 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied, 503 So. 2d 328 (Fla.
1987) and disapprovedby Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113 (Fla.
1988).
39. Id. at 1049.
40. Id.
41. 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
42. Cf FLA. STAT. § 627.429 (1991) (insurance companies may inquire about positive
HIV test results, but may not disclose the information.).
43. 508 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987), affd sub nom. Barron v. Florida
Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1988).
44. Id. at 465.
45. 493 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986), reviewdenied, 503 So. 2d 328 (Fla.
1987).
[Vol. 18
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involved."46  While confining its ruling to the underlying merits, the
Florida Supreme Court affirmed in Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers,
Inc., 7 holding that "[a]ll trials, civil and criminal, are public events and
there is a strong presumption of public access to these proceedings and their
records, subject to certain narrowly' defined exceptions., 4' The right to
privacy, in other words, must yield in the face of a key tenet of our system
of government: the presumption that all trials are public.
Echoing Winfield, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida held that Florida's right of privacy does not foreclose a
foreign government from reaching the American bank records of persons
suspected of crime.49 In their efforts to trace funds allegedly embezzled
from the Haitian government during the Duvalier regime, a subpoena, issued
on behalf of the new Haitian government, directed an American bank to turn
over records of a depositor who was a Duvalier ally. The court held that
Florida's right of privacy did not stand in the way."
In Atwell v. Sacred Heart Hospital,5' the Supreme Court of Florida
found itself in the thankless position of having to balance a child's right to
know against the rights of his natural parents. The court held that the na-
tural parent's stake in keeping their own medical records and, in turn, their
identities, under wraps did not rule out their natural child, reared by foster
parents, from prying the information out of its own medical records. 2
In Williams v. Minneola,53 police officers unthinkingly circulated
photographs and a videotape of an autopsy. The decedent's mother and
sister brought an array of tort claims against the police, who raised the
Public Records Act as a shield of immunity.54 Moreover, the defendants
46. Sirmons, 508 So. 2d at 465 (Nimmons, J., concurring).
47. 531 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1988), affg sub nom. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v.
Sirmons, 508 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
48. Id. at 114.
49. In re Letter of Request for Judicial Assistance from Tribunal Civil de Port-Au-
Prince, Republic of Haiti, 669 F. Supp. 403 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
50. For a discussion of pre-section 23 bank depositor's records cases, see Cope, supra
note 7, at 691-693. Florida's law in this area reflects federal law while California offers
depositors broader protection. Id.
51. 520 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1988).
52. See Paul J. Tartanella, Note, Sealed Adoption Records & the Constitutional Right
of Privacy of the Natural Parent, 34 RUTGERS L. REv. 451 (1982) (biological parents
decision to bring the child to term and place the baby for adoption instead of having an
abortion may rest on State's firm assurance that her identity will not be divulged).
53. 575 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, 589 So. 2d 289 (Fla.
1991).
54. FLA. STAT. §119 (1991).
19941
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enlisted section 23, attempting to stretch its last sentence to embody a grant
of immunity for the disclosure of public records. The court took issue with
this reading, ruling
that neither the Public Records Act nor the Florida Constitution grants
a custodian protection against tort liability resulting from that person's
intentionally communicating public records or their contents to someone
outside the agency which is responsible for the records unless (1) the
person inspecting the records has made a bona fide request to inspect
them, in accordance with the Public Records Act, or (2) it is necessary
to the agency's transaction of its official business to reveal the records
to a person who has not requested to see them.5
In Glatthar v. Hoequist,56 family members, thinking the aging testator
wrote them out of his will, sought access to the document in the face of the
testator's straightforward instructions preserving his will from their prying
eyes while he lived.57 When the trial court took custody of the will, the
guardian of the now infirm testator sought to divulge the will's contents by
asserting his ward's (the testator's) right to privacy. The court ruled that a
mentally unfit person has not lost the right to privacy and that a guardian
cannot defeat the ward's undelegable stake in privacy.
The privacy interests of minors has also been endorsed under section
23. In A.J. v. Times Publishing Co.,58 thirty children and their school
sought to enjoin the release of police records detailing neglect and abuse.
The court concluded the privacy interests of the children and school
outweighed unfettered access to public records. The court backed its
general constitutional privacy protection by enlisting public policy reflected
in the Public Records Act's exemption for child abuse records.59
The Florida Supreme Court, following a growing number of states,
relied on privacy to strike down a state statute compelling minors seeking
abortions to obtain either parental consent or court approval. In its
sweeping opinion in In re T.W.,6° the court confirmed that the right of
privacy under the Florida Constitution was broader than federal privacy
55. Williams, 575 So. 2d at 687.
56. 600 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
57. Id. at 1207.
58. 605 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), approved, cause remanded, 626 So.
2d 1314 (Fla. 1993).
59. See FLA. STAT. §§ !19.07(3)(a), 415.51(1)(a), 39.411(4) (1991).
60. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989). But see State v. Avila, 44 Fla. Supp. 2d 131 (6th Cir.
Ct. 1990).
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protection. Given that a minor is deemed fit to consent to any other medical
procedure tied to her pregnancy, the court assumed the girl could be
entrusted with this decision as well.
61
Florida is not alone in wielding its privacy law to combat restrictive
anti-abortion-rights laws. In 1981, the California Supreme Court relied upon
its privacy provision to strike down restrictions on state funded abortions.62
States without written privacy protection have fallen back on equal
protection.63 It is unclear whether the court in T. W would have reached
the same outcome without section 23.
Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida Inc. v. Doe64 arose after Sheriff
Deputy Jeffrey Willets and his wife, Kathy, were charged with mastermind-
ing a prostitution ring. Among discovery materials were lists of clients who
paid for Kathy Willets' sexual favors. These clients - "John Does" - sought
to defeat the public disclosure of their names and addresses. The -court
weighed the public's statutory right of access to pretrial discovery informa-
tion against the interests of these partners in crime to preserve their
anonymity. Mindful of a media feeding frenzy, the Florida Supreme Court
soberly ruled that the seal on identity must be lifted once a person is
accused of a crime. In lone dissent, Justice Kogan chided the court for
watering down privacy in the face of mere allegations of wrongdoing.
B. Medical Decisions
Among the most high-profile of the privacy cases are those governing
medical decision-making. An earlier case sets the stage. In Satz v.
Perlmutter,65 the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the right of privacy
distilled from the United States Constitution affords competent, terminally
ill adults the right to turn down or stop undue medical treatments if family
members do not object.66 The decision meshes with Florida's enlightened
61. Though not ruling them out altogether, the United States Supreme Court had
already held certain parental/judicial consent statutes to be unconstitutional. See Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622 (1979) (Bellotti 11); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). But see
Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
62. Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981).
63. Right To Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982); Moe v. Secretary of Admin.
& Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981).
64. 612 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1992).
65. 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
66. Id.
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rule that even infirm persons may lay claim to privacy.67 The harder ques-
tion is whether a guardian can ever embody that same right and refuse
treatment on behalf of the ward.
The issue came to the fore in In re Barry,68 where a district court
decided that the right of privacy, embodied in both federal and state
constitutions, entitles a guardian of an encephalitic infant to put a stop to
artificial life support. Florida's Supreme Court has since revisited this
Gothic theme. In In re T.A.C.P.,69 the court defined an anencephalitic
child as legally alive, despite the absence of any higher brain stem
activity."° In light of this finding, the court cast grave doubts on the
parent's harvesting of organs of their anencephalitic baby while she still
breathed. A Nova attorney representing the parents vainly claimed that
Florida's right to privacy enables parents to make such decisions. The court
ruled privacy played no role: "We also do not agree that a parental right of
privacy is implicated here, because privacy does not give parents the right
to donate the organs of a child born alive who is not yet legally dead."'"
However, in J.F.K. Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworth,72 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal relied upon the patient's right of privacy in
protecting the right to die. Yet, in its next breath the court conceded that
the comatose patient subjudice had no stake in the matter. Recognizing that
"a terminally ill comatose patient . . . has a right to refuse medical treat-
ment,"" the court nonetheless reckoned that the direct beneficiaries of the
patient's death, the family, had the only tangible stake-financial savings
and ending the emotional drain.74 While Bludworth purports to recognize
a right to die, its dicta seems to question that very holding.
The pace of right to die cases picked up once the Second District Court
of Appeal decided Corbett v. D'Alessandro.7 s Drawing into question both
the Florida and federal rights of privacy, the court enabled guardians to put
a stop to forced feedings of comatose wards, notwithstanding Florida law
67. SeeFLA. STAT. § 744.3215(1)(o) (1991); Glatthar v. Hoequist, 600So. 2d 1205 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
68. 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
69. 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 593 n.9.
'72. 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983), certifiedquestion answered, quashed,
452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
73. Id. at 615.
74. Id. at 619.
75. 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), reviewdenied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986).
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that left rio doubt that living wills cannot govern this form of life support.76
When the Supreme Court of Florida handed down its decision in State
v. Powell," supporters of privacy had good reason to fear that the court
was scaling back privacy protection. Powell left intact state law78 entitling
coroners to preserve corneal tissue over objections lodged by decedent's
family. Justice Shaw fired off a withering dissent, claiming that the
offending law should yield before the legitimate privacy objection of
decedent's kin. 79 Battle lines were forming.
If doubts were gathering about Florida's commitment to privacy, In re
Browning"° dispelled them. Estelle Browning, while competent, framed a
living will detailing her objections to life supports if she were rendered
unconscious.8 Some time later, a stroke rendered her unable to talk, and,
while not comatose, she endured Job-like afflictions. Unable to swallow,
she was fied by a nasogastric tube. Upsetting the lower court's ruling that
state law 82 vested control over feeding tubes beyond the reach of patients
or their guardians, 83 the high court summoned up Florida's right of
privacy, holding foresquare that section twenty-three embodies a "right of
self-determination," enabling guardians to duly carry out a ward's instruc-
tions to terminate all forms of sustenance.84 The court declared that the
"right of privacy requires that we must safeguard an individual's right to
chart his or her own medical course in the event of later incapacity. 85 In
challenging a patient's right of self-determination, the State must show it has
"a compelling interest great enough to override this constitutional
right" 6-no easy task.
76. FLA. STAT. § 765.03(3)(b) (1991).
77. 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987).
78. FLA. STAT. § 732.9185 (1991).
79. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1194 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
80. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
81. Id. at 8; see also FLA. STAT. § 765.05 (1991) (suggesting identical language).
82. Life.-Prolonging Procedure Act of Florida, FLA. STAT. §§ 765.01-765.15 (1991).
83. The Act was amended prior to the Browning decision but after the cause of action
arose to include the provision of sustenance in the definition of "life-prolonging procedure."
84. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 4.
85. Id. at 13.
86. Id. at 14.
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C. Blood Testing
State v. Brewster,87 posed the question whether a sexually abused
child could be forced to undergo AIDS testing. Balancing competing
interests, the victim's privacy right to fend off governmental intrusion easily
won out over the defendant's right to know, absent evidence of compelling
need.88 The case, meanwhile, leaves open the ripe question whether one
may be pressed to undergo AIDS testing in the face of telltale signs that he
or she carries the virus.
The Florida Supreme Court in Fraternal Order of Police v. Miami89
approved drug testing9" police officers in light of evidence of drug use,
notwithstanding silence on the issue in the collective bargaining agreement.
In concurring, Justice Kogan noted that the case "raises distinct problems"
under section 23 and that those concerns will not go away.
The right to refuse a blood test is yet another by-product of section 23.
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Privette91 embodies the
principle that a putative father may object to blood tests without weighing
the child's best interest or the rights of the child's legal father. 92 Raising
a privacy interest under section 23, the father called into question the best
interests of the child. Therefore, whether the father has standing to raise the
interests of the child is far from clear. 93 As stated by the court:
[A] compelling interest does not come into existence in the abstract but
must be based on adequate factual allegations and a record establishing
that the test itself is in the child's best interests. Absent that, the State's
interest does not reach the threshold of being 'compelling': The blood
test thus would be an improper intrusion into the putative father's
privacy, if he has properly asserted this right. Art. 1, § 23, FLA.
CONST. However, any such privacy claim is merely collateral to the
overriding concern in the case: the child's best interests.94
87. 601 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
88. Id.
89. 609 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1992).
90. See also Wn. Andrew Hamilton, Note, Constitutional Law-Drug Testing of
Florida's Public Employees: When May a Public Employer Require Urinalysis?-City of
Palm Beachv. Bauman, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 101 (1987); Stephen M. Fogel et al., Survey
of the Law on Employee Drug Testing, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 553 (1988).
91. 617 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1993).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 309.
94. Id.
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In dissent, Justice Grimes observed that "[t]o suggest that Florida's constitu-
tional right to privacy permits a putative father to refuse a blood test in
order to avoid the possibility of having to support his child offends ordinary
principles of justice. 95
The religious-grounded refusal of a life-saving blood transfusion has
been upheld by the Florida Supreme Court in Public Health Trust v.
Wons.96 Although the same outcome could be reached on privacy grounds,
the court held that a Jehovah's Witness was entitled to turn down a blood
transfusion, even at the risk of leaving minor children motherless. This
decision goes further than many states in striking the balance on the side of
personal autonomy, despite the specter of minor children ending up as wards
of the state.
97
D. Publication of Ads About Convicts
In Lindlsay v. State,9" a court measured section 23 against a county's
policy of publishing drunk drivers' mug shot, name and the caption "DUI--
Convicted" in local newspapers. So long as the conditions of probation bear
on the probationer's past or future criminality or relate to the rehabilitative
purposes of probation, the court reasoned, even constitutional rights can be
trimmed, including the right of privacy.99
E. Marijuana Possession
Marijuana possession is one area where section 23 has not made a dent
in the law. Unlike Alaska, which applied its state constitutional privacy
provision to safeguard marijuana use in the home,' °0 Florida courts have
consistently ruled out any legal footing for marijuana use, twice before
95. Id. at 310 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
96. 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
97. See also St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(adults without dependents entitled to refuse medical treatment on religious grounds).
98. 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 618 So. 2d 209 (Fla.
1993).
99. Id. at .356-57; see Scott Michael Solkoff, Note, Judicial Use Immunity and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Court Mandated Therapy Programs, 17 NOVA L. REv.
1441 (1993) (weighing the abridgment of Fifth Amendment rights in the service of rehabilita-
tion).
100. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (invalidated statute barring possession
of marijuana in home; privacy in the home enjoyed constitutional status as part of the right
of privacy in the Alaska Constitution).
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section 23, in Borras v. State'' and in Laird v. State.'o2  At the time of
its conception, conservative critics of the proposed section held up legalizing
marijuana use as one of the parade of horribles the constitutional provision
would unleash upon an unwary public. They needn't have worried. Maisler
v. State °3 affirmed Florida's longstanding article of faith that the right of
privacy does not sanction the personal possession of marijuana.
F. Sexual Matters
Privacy plays a supporting role in state obscenity prosecutions. In
Parnell v. St. Johns County, °4 a dancer challenged the constitutionality of
a county ban on nudity in public places or in any establishment serving
alcohol.' The court did not reach the merits of the claim, dismissing the
case on procedural grounds. However, the ruling left dicta indicating that
privacy's protective shield covers only natural persons-it cannot be raised
by one's corporate employer in a pending federal suit." 6
In Schmitt v. State,' °7 the district court found that section 23 does not
stand in the way of prosecuting a father for snapping nude pictures of his
daughter, videotaping his daughter and another teenage girl dancing topless,
and other "lewd and lascivious" activities.0 8
Similarly, in Stall v. State,10 9 the State enlisted Florida's RICO Act
in charging individuals for violations of state obscenity laws, as reflected in
the rental, sale, and showing of "obscene" videos and publications. "0 The
trial court struck down the obscenity statute, citing section 23. The Second
District Court of Appeal reversed, ruling that section 23 does not shield
obscenity."' Affirming the Second District, the Florida Supreme Court
101. 229 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 808
(1970).
102. 342 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1977).
103. 425 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982), reviewdenied, 434 So. 2d 888 (Fla.
1983).
104. 603 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 57.
107. 563 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), approved in part and quashed in
part, 590 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1572 (1992).
108. Id. at 1100.
109. 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Long v. State, 111 S. Ct. 2888
(1991).
110. Id. at 257.
11l. State v. Long, 544 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989), approved sub nom.
Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2888 (1991).
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underscored that section 23 does not protect purveyors of sexually explicit
products--there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in the sale or
purchase of such prurient products."12  However, taking its cue from
federal law, the court left little doubt, in dicta, that purely private possession
of obscenity comes under section 23's protective umbrella." 3
G. Search and Seizure
In Katz v. United States,"4 the Supreme Court said that the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."' Moreover, it warned against
translating the Fourth Amendment into a general constitutional right of
privacy."'6
One way of setting search and seizure cases apart from Griswold
privacy is to focus on the nature of the interest at stake in each. In the
Fourth Amendment setting, privacy targets unfair and intrusive methods,
processes, and procedures, while Griswold privacy entails substantive rights,
like the right to an abortion.
A running theme in many criminal search and seizure cases in Florida
is the weight due section 23 in light of section 12's "conformity amend-
ment." Alone among the fifty states, Florida constitutionally commands its
courts to count United States Supreme Court rulings as governing precedent
when it comes to search and seizure. Since section 23 embodies wider
protection of an individual's right to be let alone than does federal law, the
privacy provision runs up against strict conformity with federal search and
seizure law. Four Florida Supreme Court cases frame this theme.
In Riley v. State,"7 the Florida Supreme Court enlisted section 23 in
striking down a warrantless helicopter search of a greenhouse. Sounding a
bold note, Justice Barkett announced that "[o]ur own right to privacy
amendment, article I, section 23, Florida Constitution, was meant to protect
against governmental encroachments on privacy made possible by increas-
ingly sophisticated investigative techniques.""'  By invoking section 23,
the court widened the protections against search and seizure, perhaps in
defiance of the conformity amendment. On appeal, the United States
112. Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1989), cert. denied. II1 S. Ct. 2888 (1991).
113. Id. at 261; see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
114. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
115. Id. at 351.
116. Id. at 350.
117. 511 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1987), rev d, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
118. Id. at 288.
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Supreme Court, noting the waiver of federalism embodied in section 12's
conformity amendment, reversed, holding that such warrantless searches do
not tread on federal search and seizure law." 9 Some might say that Riley
ironed out too many wrinkles.
This stinging rebuke has rendered Florida's Supreme Court's liberal
wing slow to broaden search and seizure law in light of section 12 and
Riley. In State v. Wells, 2 ' the court deemed inadmissible marijuana
cigarettes left in an automobile's ashtray as well as a garbage bag of
marijuana sealed inside a locked suitcase in the car's trunk. In that case, the
DUI suspect consented only to a search of the trunk and the police fell short
of legal grounds to open the telltale containers.
Without putting too fine a point on it, the court warily tapped section
23 to take exception to the "zone of privacy" framework. The same year
as Wells, the court decided Shaktman v. State,' holding that although
section 23 is triggered by the warrantless use of PEN registers, the
compelling state interest test is met, thus putting to rest section 23
concerns. 122 When Shaktman is read alongside Riley and the conformity
clause, it raises the specter that section 23 may still play a supporting role
in Florida search and seizure cases, so long as the outcome squares with
federal search and seizure law. Shaktman also sheds light on the history and
footing of section 23. State v. Jimeno'23 underscores the tension between
section 23 and section 12's conformity clause. Until then, the Florida
Supreme Court had ruled that general consent to a car search did not cover
the opening of a closed paper bag lying inside the vehicle. The United
States Supreme Court reversed. Swallowing its pride, the Florida Supreme
Court ruled section 12's conformity clause trumps section 23.124 This
uneasy "accommodation" of two clashing constitutional themes seems settled
for the time being.
One interesting case recounts how Doreen Heller and her passenger
were pulled over by police after a tag check matched the registration with
119. State v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
120. 539 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1989), affd, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
121. 553 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1989).
122. Id. at 151; see Baird v. State, 553 So. 2d 187 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (same
facts), quashed, 572 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1990); Hastetter v. Behan, 639 P.2d 510 (Mont. 1982)
(toll records of telephone subscribers are protected by Montana's constitutional guaranty of
privacy); see also Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985)
(setting up strict scrutiny analysis).
123. 588 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1991).
124. Madsen v. State, 502 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), affd, 521 So. 2d
110 (Fla. 1988).
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a different vehicle.'25 With license and registration in hand, it finally
dawned on the officers that they had called in the wrong tag ID. Duly
corrected, Heller was told she was free to go. Before pulling out, however,
one officer noticed "track marks" on the passenger's arms. Heller was
instructed to leave the car for questioning. In due course, Heller confessed
that illegal drugs were in the car. The ensuing search yielded the contra-
band. 12
6
The Fifth District Court of Appeal, reversing the trial court's admission
of the drugs into evidence, grounded its ruling upon scant "founded
suspicion" to warrant the second "Terry" stop.' 27 Breaking new ground
(or digging a ditch) in light of the conformity amendment, the court relied
on section 23 to defeat the search and seizure. 2
One case shedding light on the turf war waged by section 12 and
section 23 is Forrester v. State, 29 in which the district court compared a
section 12 analysis with a section 23 analysis. 3 ° The court did not rule
on the merits of the section 23 claim since it was not raised below. The
court did, however, map out a helpful comparison of the burdens of proof
between section 23 and search and seizure law, hinting at the proper role
section 23 might play.' 3' In addressing the interplay between section 12
and 23, the court casts some role for section 23. But why lay out two
competing tests of search and seizure law if one, section 12, governs?
125. Heller v. State, 576 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
126. Id.
127. Id at 399; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
128. Heller, 576 So. 2d at 400 (citing the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and article I, sections 12 and 23 of the Florida Constitution).
129. 565 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
130. Id
131. The Forrester court stated:
In the search-and-seizure context, once a defendant has established that he or she
had a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances, and that a
warrantless search and seizure occurred, the burden shifts to the state to
demonstrate that the search was reasonable-that the state was not required to
obtain a warrant under the circumstances .... In comparison, when a defendant
raises a privacy challenge, the defendant must first show that the government has
intruded into an area encompassed within the 'zone of privacy' protected by
section 23. Only then does the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that the
challenged intrusion "serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal
through the use of the least intrusive means." Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547. The
state's burden in the search and seizure context is far less stringent than that
under article I, section 23.
Forrester, 565 So. 2d at 393 (some citations omitted).
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In State v. Kerwick,'32 the court enlisted section 23 in finding that
police overstepped the bounds of Fourth Amendment propriety. The case
arose after officers cornered Kerwick's car, flashed their badges, and then
"asked" if they could pick through her luggage as she awaited a bus.
Feeling trapped, Kerwick consented to a search. Officers found a locked
container inside her suitcase and sliced it open with a knife, revealing a bag
of cocaine.13  While paying lip service to the Fourth Amendment, the
court embraced section 23 to find that Kerwick did not knowingly and
voluntarily consent to the search.134
On the other hand, Madsen v. State13 brings home the limited role
section 23 plays in search and seizure cases. Federal opinions premised on
section 12's conformity clause, have sustained the admissibility of an
unauthorized tape recording capturing Madsen's complicity in drug
trafficking. The court noted that absent the conformity amendment, the tape
could not be tapped, but that now they were duty-bound to leave intact the
trial judge's ruling of admissibility. 3 6  Madsen weighed in that the
recording tread on his right of privacy as embodied in section 23. The court
rejected the claim, lamenting, "[i]f we were to apply the right to privacy in
the manner proposed by appellant, we would effectively nullify the
constitutional amendment to section 12, and this is obviously not an
appropriate judicial prerogative."' 37  It is helpful to contrast the Madsen
case with that of State v. Calhoun3 1 in which the same court upheld a
similar suppression order on grounds of section 12 and 23 violations.
139
In Calhoun, law enforcement intercepted jailhouse conversations between
the suspect and his brother after assurances that their talks were private.
The court cast aside governing case law owing that "none of those control-
ling decisions discussed the Article 1, sections 12 and 23, protections of the
Florida Constitution cited above, but were decided on Fourth and Fifth
Amendment principles."' 4 ° To be sure, the two decisions clash over the
footing of section 23 on search and seizure matters. The only way to meld
the two opinions may be that, over time, the clout of section 23 has
132. 512 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 348; see also Maulden v. State, 617 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1993).
135. 502 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), affid, 521 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1988).
136. Madsen, 502 So. 2d at 950.
137. Id. at 950; see also State v. Jimeno, 588 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1991); State v. Hume,
512 So. 2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1987).
138. 479 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
139. Id. at 245.
140. Id. at 244.
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gathered force, though, of course, both opinions were rendered well before
Riley.14
1
H. Parents' Stake in Children's Lives
Can grandparents win visitation rights over the objections of the child's
parents? In Sketo v. Brown, 142 the appellate court brushed aside privacy
claims raised by the parents, and instead adopted the "best interest of the
child" test.'43 This standard measures the clashing interests between
parents and grandparents, including the state's freestanding stake in the
welfare of children. 14
4
Whenever one person makes decisions for another person, a shift of
privacy rights takes place. In the field of parental rights, the childrens' right
to privacy is often subordinated to the parents or to the State. 45  For
example, the privacy rights of "immature" minors may give way to the
power of the parent or the State. 146  Similarly, a child's right to self
determination yields to the State's power to compel education.
47
I. Victim Examinations
In State v. Drab,4 ' the district court would not order a second
gynecological examination of an eight-year-old child allegedly abused by
her father, unless the test was necessary to insure that the due process rights
of the accused were not violated. 149 In framing the issue in these terms,
the court sidestepped the privacy issue. 5° The court does not say why the
privacy rights of the child or complaining witness do not figure into the
legal equation. Perhaps because the compelling state interest test of
14 1. See also Adams v. State, 436 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (audio and
video recordings of a storefront "sting operation" did not violate defendant's right of
privacy).
142. 559 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
143. Id. at 382.
144. Id.
145. See generally Privacy in Family and Home, in 3 PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE
22 (George B. Trubow, ed., 1991).
146. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
147. Pierce v, Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
148. 546 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 553 So. 2d 1164 (Fla.
1989).
149. Id. at 55.
150. Id.
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Winfield yields the same outcome.151
In State v. Brewster,"' a sexually abused child was free to forgo
AIDS testing. 153 The appellate court reasoned that the victim's right to be
let alone far outweighed the defendant's poorly articulated need for the
information.'54
J. Victimless Crimes
To some there is no such animal as a victimless crime. Even those
crimes which have no "direct" victim often leave indirect victims in their
wake. This does not, however, put to rest the rather convincing argument
that government should not police an individual's action when that act falls
short of harming others. Section 23 may serve as a useful vehicle for those
challenging governmental control over their private affairs.t'" To date,
however, the Amendment has been rendered toothless. Case in point is the
handling of the personal possession laws. In Maisler v. State,15 6 the
district court held its ground that Florida's right of privacy may not serve
to strike down laws criminalizing the personal possession of marijuana. 57
In State v. Phillips,'58 Phillips and Williams were charged with
statutory rape. The trial judge struck down, as unconstitutional, the
governing statute that barred consent as a defense. 59 The trial court held
that the statute "violated the minor's right of privacy guaranteed by Article
1, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution. .. ,,60 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal reversed, finding that Phillips and Williams lacked standing
to assert the "victim's" right of privacy. 16' The appellate court did not tip
its hand, however, regarding how a minor might ever challenge the statute's
constitutionality, thus enabling a third party to assert the claim.
62
151. See also State v. Diamond, 553 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
152. 601 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1291.
155. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
156. 425 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982), review denied, 434 So. 2d 888 (Fla.
1983).
157. Id.
158. 575 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 589 So. 2d 292 (Fla.
1991).
159. Id. at 1314.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
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In Wyche v. Florida,63 the court construed a Tampa ordinance
prohibiting loitering. The statute prohibited loitering
while a pedestrian or in a motor vehicle, in or near any thoroughfare or
place open to the public in a manner and under circumstances manifest-
ing the purpose of inducing, enticing, soliciting, or procuring another to
commit an act of prostitution, sodomy, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturba-
tion for hire, pandering, or other lewd or indecent act. Among the
circumstances which may be considered in determining whether this
purpose is manifested are: that such person ... repeatedly beckons to,
stops or attempts to stop, or engages passers-by in conversation, or
repeatedly stops, or attempts to stop motor vehicle operators by hailing,
waving of arms or any bodily gesture. . 64
The Florida Supreme Court struck the ordinance down as unconstitutionally
vague, among other grounds. 65 In dicta, the court noted that "many of
the activities implicated by the ordinance fall into the realm of personal
autonomy that is protected by article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitu-
tion. ',
166
K. Commercial Speech
Another hotbed of privacy litigation on a national scale is the
permissible bounds of commercial speech. Florida's privacy right has come
into play only once in this area. In State v. Rampell,167 the court mea-
sured the First Amendment against the right of privacy in upholding the
constitutionality of a state statute. 68 The statute barred uninvited, in-
person, direct solicitation of clients by certified public accountants. 69 The
court found the minimal right of free commercial speech to be outweighed
by the right of the citizenry to be let alone. 7°
163. 619 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1993).
164. Id. at 233 (quoting TAMPA, FLA. CODE § 24-61A10 (1987)).
165. Id. at 234.
166. Id at 235 n.5 (citing In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 9-10 (Fla. 1990)).
167. 589 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991), approved in part and quashed in
part, 621 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1993).
168. Id. at 1353.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1360.
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L. Vagueness Doctrine
The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Wyche v. Florida,17" ' holds
promise for privacy in its dicta.' The case concerned a City of Tampa
ordinance prohibiting loitering.'73 The Florida Supreme Court ruled the
ordinance unconstitutional on vagueness and other grounds. 74 In dicta,
the court noted that "many of the activities implicated by the ordinance fall
into the realm of personal autonomy that is protected by article I, section 23
of the Florida Constitution."' 75 In time, this decision may prove a potent
weapon to test the constitutionality of arguably over-broad statutes.1
76
M. Cable Television
Florida privacy law has never addressed privacy concerns attending
cable television. California, by contrast, makes it illegal for a cable
television provider to use any electronic device to record, transmit, or
observe any events inside a subscriber's premises.'77 In the District of
Columbia, a cable franchisee must exercise "the highest possible standard
of care" in not disseminating its subscriber's viewing selections, financial
transactions, and/or the utilization of other cable-related interactive
services.7  This information may not be released even upon a valid
subpoena or search warrant.' 79 Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, and
Wisconsin have similar laws. 8°
171. 619 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1993).
172. See also discussion supra part II.J.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 234.
175. Id. at 235 (citing In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 9-10).
176. See Nan Feyler, Note, The Use of the State Constitutional Right of Privacy to
Defeat State Sodomy Laws, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 973 (1986); Yao Apasu-
Gbotsu et al., Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual
Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521 (1986) (federal and state cases). A few states have relied
on state constitutional privacy provisions to strike down their sodomy statutes. E.g.,
Michigan Organization for Human Rights v. Kelley, No. 88-815820CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct.,
Wayne County 1990) (covering both heterosexual and homosexual sodomy), Kentucky v.
Wasson, No. 86-X-48 (Ky. Cir. Ct., Fayette County, 1990) (covering only homosexual
sodomy).
177. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.5 (West 1993).
178. D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-1845 (1992).
179. Id.
180. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-333 (West 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 38, § 87-2
(Smith-Hurd 1993); N.J. REV. STAT. § 48:5A-1 (1992); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 134.43,
968.27(1) (West 1992).
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III. PRIVACY STATUTES OR CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS IN OTHER STATES
Florida aside, other states have raised privacy to the level of constitu-
tional codification, though with uneven results. In Alaska, as of 1972,
"[t]he right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be
infringed."'' In Arizona, "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."'812 In California,
"[a]ll people are by their nature free and independent," and among their
inalienable rights are "pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and priva-
cy."' 83 Hawaii's search and seizure law adds some interesting language
to the familiar formula: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures,
and invasions ofprivacy shall not be violated. . ."' " Article one, section
twelve of the Illinois Constitution provides that there shall be "prompt" and
"certain" relief for "injuries and wrongs" to one's privacy. ' 15  Like
Hawaii, Louisiana explicitly adds the right of privacy to its search and
seizure provision.'86 In Montana, it is recognized that "[tihe right of
individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest."' 87
In New York, the states' search and seizure provision is identical to its
federal counterpart, except that the state adds language strengthening the
sanctity of private communications.'88
Other states, while not elevating their concerns to constitutional
dimensions, have made provisions by legislative enactment. In Delaware,
for example, violation of privacy is a Class A misdemeanor.'89 In Georgia
and Louisiana, it is illegal to invade one's privacy or to be a "peeping
Tom."' 90 In Maine, a person is guilty of invasion of privacy if, under
certain circumstances, he or she trespasses with the intent to eavesdrop or
installs or uses any device that can transmit or record sounds or images.91
181. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
182. ARIz. CONST. art. 11, § 8.
183. CAL. CONST. art. I, § I.
184. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5 (emphasis added).
185. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12.
186. LA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
187. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
188. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1993).
189. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I1, § 1335 (1992).
190. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3002 (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:284 (West 1992).
191. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 511 (West 1992).
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In Massachusetts, "a person shall have a right against unreasonable,
substantial or serious interference with his privacy." '192  Rhode Island
enumerates Prosser's four traditional categories of tort privacy after its
declaration that "It is the policy of this state that every person in this state
shall have a right to privacy .. ."193 Utah's privacy protections are
specifically strengthened in the area of eavesdropping and the misuse of
listening or recording devices.'94
In the area of tort privacy, most states recognize the traditional torts at
common law, with the apparent exception of Minnesota, Nevada, North
Dakota, and Wyoming. 95 It should also be understood that those states
which have constitutionalized their right to privacy, often pass more specific
legislation.'96
IV. CONCLUSION
Thirteen years of parsing section 23 have taken the luster off privacy's
promise. So far, hopes outrun reality. The cases bring sharply into focus
that all too often privacy plays second banana to competing interests.
192. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § IB (West 1989).
193. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1 (1992).
194. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-401 (1993).
195. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS
(1992).
196. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 455.241 (Supp. 1992) (disclosure of medical records); 559.72
(Supp. 1992) (release of credit information); 659.062 (protection of social security numbers)
(1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39.2-304 (1992) (polygraphs).
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